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Abstract
In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 483-521) analyze symmetric and asymmetric
investment games similar to two-player all-pay auctions with bid caps. In this note, we
correct an error in their characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of their symmetric
investment game. In particular, we ﬁnd equilibria that Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000)
fail to identify. Taking these equilibria into account has important implications for the
analysis of data from Rapoport and Amaldoss’s experiments.
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1Caps on Bidding in All-Pay Auctions: Comments on the Experiments of A. Rapoport and
W. Amaldoss.
1 Introduction
In a recent article in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) analyze an investment
game of complete information in which two ﬁrms compete for a patent or the monopoly
rights to a product. The ﬁrms compete by simultaneously investing in R&D, the level of
which may be chosen from a common ﬁnite grid of feasible R&D levels. Both ﬁrms face
budget constraints (endowments) that are common knowledge and that place upper bounds
on each ﬁrm’s feasible amount invested. The ﬁrm that invests the higher amount wins the
patent or monopoly right (henceforth the "prize") and earns a payoﬀ equal to the value of
the prize plus its endowment minus its investment. The ﬁrm that invests the lower amount
obtains a payoﬀ equal to its endowment minus its investment. If ﬁrms set the same level
of investment neither wins the prize and both lose their investment. It is assumed that the
value of the prize is identical to the two ﬁrms, but two separate assumptions on budget
constraints are examined: in Case 1 ﬁrms have identical budget constraints and in Case 2
one ﬁrm has a marginally larger budget than the other ﬁrm ($1 larger with a grid of mesh
$1).
The two games examined by Rapoport and Amaldoss (henceforth R-A) are speciﬁc
examples of a type of game that is known in the rent-seeking literature as an all-pay auction
with bid caps. Except for the fact that R-A examine an all-pay auction with discrete strategy
space and for the assumption made by R-A that in the event of a tie in expenditure both
ﬁrms lose the prize, the game analyzed is very similar to the treatment of the all-pay auction
with bid caps analyzed by Che and Gale (1998).1
In R-A (2000) the authors undertake an experimental analysis of the two cases of all-pay
auctions indicated above. This note focuses on the conclusions of the authors concerning Case
1, the game in which ﬁrms have identical budget constraints. For this case, R-A claim that a
unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists in the game (Rapoport and Amaldoss 2000,
Proposition 1) and that their experimental results lend support to several of the properties
of this solution at the aggregate, although not the individual, level. In particular, R-A claim
that the experimental analysis seems to indicate that the players "mixed their strategies" and
that the frequency of the choice of an expenditure equal to the budget constraint increased
as the prize obtained from winning increased. On the other hand, several properties of the
equilibrium identiﬁed by R-A were not supported by the experimental results. One prediction
of the equilibrium identiﬁed in R-A’s Proposition 1 is that the expected payoﬀ of each player
is independent of the (common) value of the prize to the players. R-A’s experiments with
prizes of diﬀerent values (but identical budget constraints) showed that the mean realized
payoﬀs to the players increased signiﬁcantly in the value of the prize. R-A also found that
the incidence of subjects choosing a zero investment in the game was higher than predicted
1In Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Lugovskyy (2003) we refer to the game in which both ﬁrms lose the prize
in the event of a tie in expenditure as the "full dissipation" case. The case examined by Che and Gale (1998),
in which ﬁrms either split the prize or fairly randomize to determine the winner of the prize is referred to as
the "partial dissipation" case.
2by the equilibrium, a fact that they conjectured could be a consequence of either minimax
behavior or simply "mixing strategies but investing zero more often than predicted by the
theory" (R-A (2000), p. 497).
This note utilizes the results of Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Lugovskyy (2003) (henceforth
D-K-L) to show that, contrary to the claim of R-A’s Proposition 1, the Nash equilibrium for
the Investment game with symmetric budget constraints examined by R-A is not generally
unique. D-K-L (2003) show that for strategy spaces comprised of an equally spaced grid of
an even number of strategies strictly greater than 2 (starting with a lower bound of zero and
an upper bound less than the lower of the players’ valuations of the prize) there exist three
mixed strategy equilibria in the two-player Investment game analyzed by R-A. One of these
equilibria is that identiﬁed by R-A, a symmetric equilibrium with full support and players
completely dissipating all expected gains from winning the prize. The other two equilibria
in the context of the symmetric game examined by R-A (2000) involve mixed strategies with
an alternating structure. One ﬁrm randomizes placing positive probability at investment
levels ci =0 ,2,4,...,e− 1 and the other ﬁrm randomizes placing positive probability at
investment levels cj =1 ,3,...,e,w h e r ee is the common budget constraint of the two ﬁrms.
We believe that the failure of R-A to account for the existence of other equilibria in their
Investment game is the result of the erroneous claim used in the proof of their Proposition 1
that both ﬁr m se a r na ne x p e c t e dp r o ﬁt of zero from the Investment game (and hence earn an
expected utility equal to their initial endowment e).2 Indeed, in the asymmetric equilibria
that we identify the ﬁrm investing odd unit amounts (1,3,...,,e) earns a positive expected
payoﬀ f r o mt h eg a m et h a ti si n c r e a s i n gi nt h ev a l u eo ft h ep r i z ew h i l et h eﬁrm investing even
unit amounts earns zero. Hence, in these alternating equilibria dissipation of the value of
the prize is partial and the expected payoﬀ o fo n eo ft h ep l a y e r si si n c r e a s i n gi nt h ev a l u eo f
the prize.
The existence of these alternating equilibria and the possibility that some subset of
experimental subjects may sometimes play the corresponding equilibrium strategies leaves
open the possibility that the experimental evidence examined in R-A (2000) is more consistent
with Nash equilibrium behavior than is evident from the R-A analysis. Like the symmetric
equilibrium, the alternating equilibria have the property that the frequency of the choice of
an expenditure equal to the budget constraint increases as the prize obtained from winning
increases. Moreover, since the alternating equilibria have the property that one player
receives a positive payoﬀ that is increasing in the common value of the prize, while the
other player receives zero (and therefore the utility of his endowment), aggregate behavior
under these alternating equilibria will exhibit a mean payoﬀ increasing in the value of the
2The error in R-A’s Proposition 1 arises because proving that the system provided in (A1) and (A2) of
the proof of Proposition 1 (R-A (2000), p. 518) has a unique solution is not suﬃcient to prove uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. This system assumes that the equilibrium payoﬀ to the two
players is the value of their budget, which may not hold in equilibrium. The system (A1) also is written
with equality in every row. However, if the probability of choosing a particular pure strategy c is zero, the
equation corresponding to that strategy in (A1) should in fact be a weak inequality. (See, for instance,
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994) for a rigorous treatment of the programming framework for solving
for the Nash equilibria of all-pay auctions with discrete strategy spaces.) By imposing (A1) as it is stated,
R-A implicitly eliminate all mixed strategies that do not have full support (that is, have p(c) > 0 for
c =0 ,1,2,...,e.)
3prize. This property is consistent with the pattern appearing in R-A’s experimental data, but
is not a property of the symmetric equilibrium that they identify. Furthermore, as long as
the value of the prize r satisﬁes r>e +1, which holds in both of the symmetric experimental
treatments analyzed by R-A, the frequency of zero investments in the alternating equilibria
is larger than that in the symmetric equilibrium. The frequency of zero investments in
the alternating equilibria is also larger than the frequency of any speciﬁc investment level
strictly between zero and the budget constraint e, a property that appears to be supported
by the experimental data. Hence, one may not need to appeal to minimax or non-equilibrium
behavior to explain the pattern of zero expenditure choices in the data.3
In section 2 we review the characterization of the set of Nash equilibria of the two-player
Investment game appearing in Dechenaux, Kovenock, and Lugovskyy (2003). Section 3
concludes by examining the implications of this characterization for the experimental results
reported in Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000).
2 The model and theoretical results
Suppose there are two ﬁrms indexed by i and j.E a c h ﬁrm receives a similar integer
endowment (or budget) e>1 and each ﬁrm’s value for the prize is r>e .L e t Ck ≡ C =
{0,1,2,...,e} denote ﬁrm k’s (pure) strategy space, k ∈ {i,j}.I f a ﬁrm invests a higher
amount than its rival, it receives the prize and pays the amount it invested. Otherwise, it
receives nothing but still pays the amount it invested. Thus ﬁrm k’s payoﬀ function is:
Uk(ck,c −k)=
(
r + e − ck if ck >c −k,
e − ck if ck ≤ c−k. for k ∈ {i,j}.
In the mixed extension of the game, let pk(c) denote a probability distribution over the
elements of C. Uk(pk,p −k) is then ﬁrm k0se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ, k ∈ {i,j}.
According to R-A’s Proposition 1, the game described above has a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium (see R-A, p. 488). This equilibrium is symmetric and is such that each ﬁrm
earns an expected proﬁte q u a lt oe.W es h o wb e l o wt h a tR - A ’ sP r o p o s i t i o n1i se r r o n e o u s .
Under fairly general conditions, and more importantly, under the conditions satisﬁed in R-
A’s experiments for this game, there exist three equilibria. In the two equilibria R-A fail to
3R-A also observe strong sequential dependencies in the choices of subjects in their experiments. They
claim (R-A (2000), p. 500) that one implication of the Nash equilibrium that they identify is that "the
mixed-strategy solution calls for perfect randomization of choices between successive trials." They go on to
note that "in order to eliminate sequential dependencies, the subjects’ pairing...was deliberately changed
from trial to trial." However, in an idealized environment in which it is common knowledge that subjects
never meet more than once in a session and outcomes from each play of the game are known only to the pair
playing, equilibrium does not require independent randomization across plays of the game. Randomizing
once according to the particular Nash equilibrium strategy at the beginning of the session and playing the
same realization in every play of the game would constitute equilibrium behavior. To the extent that R-
A’s experiments do not replicate this idealized environment, in particular, since players meet more than
once in each session, this one-time randomization does not constitute equilibrium behavior. However, it
is not clear to us that subjects in the experiment do not take the experimental environment to be a close
enough approximation to the idealized anonymous environment of perfect strangers to justify one-time
randomization. At least a subset of the subjects in the R-A experiments exhibit behavior consistent with
this explanation.
4identify, one ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is equal to r (and its rival’s is equal to e), and is therefore
increasing in the reward r. These results are summarized in Claim 1 below.











r if c =0 ,1,...,e− 1
1 − e






If e is odd, there exist three Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is characterized by (1) and
satisﬁes U∗
i = U∗
j = e. The two other equilibria are given by (p∗
k,p ∗














if c = e
















r if c =2 ,4,...,e − 1
0 if c =1 ,3,...,e
(3)
In such equilibria, expected payoﬀs are given by U∗
k = r>eand U∗
−k = e, k ∈ {i,j}.
The "symmetric" equilibrium of equation (1) and the "alternating" equilibria characterized
by equations (2) and (3) have several properties of empirical interest. First of all, aggregating
across the two players, both types of equilibria place greater probability at an investment
equal to the endowment, e, than at any one of the investment levels 1,2,...,e−1. However,
the alternating equilibria place the same aggregate probability at 0 as at e,w h e r e a st h e
symmetric equilibrium places the same probability at 0 as at each of the levels 1,2,...,e−1.
The expected payoﬀs aggregated across the two players also diﬀer across the two types of
equilibria. In the symmetric equilibrium, the two players dissipate all expected gains from
the competition for the prize, and each earns an expected payoﬀ equal to their common
endowment level, e.T h i s e x p e c t e d p a y o ﬀ is, of course, invariant with respect to the value
of the prize, r. In the alternating equilibria one player earns an expected payoﬀ equal to r
while the other earns an expected payoﬀ equal to e. Aggregating across the two players, the
mean expected payoﬀ of a player playing an alternating equilibrium is r+e
2 , an expression
which is increasing in the common value of the prize, r. The following section examines
which of these properties is supported by R-A’s reported experimental results.
3 Implications for the Analysis of Experimental Data
Rapoport and Amaldoss’s (2000) Proposition 1 is used as a theoretical prediction against
which the data from experiments are evaluated. In particular, the authors consider two
games with the following parameters:
Low Reward Condition (Game L) : e =5 ,r=8
High Reward Condition (Game H) : e =5 ,r=2 0
5In R-A (2000), theoretical frequency distributions of investments for both games are calculated
in accordance with Proposition 1 and presented in R-A’s Table 3 along with aggregated
experimental data. Note that according to our Claim 1, the symmetric equilibrium deﬁned
by R-A’s Proposition 1 is not unique in both games. Since e =5 , the two "alternating"
equilibria deﬁned in Claim 1 also exist in both games. Using equations (2) and (3), we
calculate the equilibrium solutions for the alternating equilibria in both games.
























=( 0 .5, 0, 0.25, 0, 0.25, 0)
for k ∈ {i,j}.
























=( 0 .8, 0, 0.1, 0, 0.1, 0),
for k ∈ {i,j}.
We can use these solutions to calculate the frequency distributions of choices for alternating
equilibria. Since the frequency distribution contains information about how often each pure
strategy is played in each game, in the case of two players, for every investment c ∈ C,t h i s







for a ∈ {L,H} and k ∈ {i,j}. (4)
It is straightforward to verify that for both symmetric games that R-A analyze, the predicted
frequency of a zero investment is greater in alternating equilibria than it is in the symmetric
equilibrium. From (1), the predicted frequency of a zero investment in the symmetric
equilibrium is 1
r. Using (2), (3), and (4) the predicted frequency of a zero investment in





















a condition that is satisﬁed when e is equal to 5 and r is equal to 8 or 20.
We extend Table 3 of R-A to include the frequency distributions of investments for
alternating equilibria. The results are presented in Table 1 below.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
6Table 1 shows that taking alternating equilibria into consideration does not aﬀect the
theoretical predictions for the frequency of investments 1 to 4, but it widens the range for
0 and 5. In fact, if we compare the experimental data with the theoretical predictions for
the symmetric equilibrium, the frequencies for investments 0 and 5 have the largest absolute
deviations. It is clear from Table 1 that widening the range of possible frequencies for
i n v e s t m e n t s0a n d5a l l o w sf o ras i g n i ﬁcant reduction in the diﬀerence between observed and
predicted investment frequencies.
In the experiments of R-A, subjects in Group 1 play 80 periods of Game L and then 80
periods of Game H, while subjects in Group 2 participate in the two games in the reverse
order. In Table 1 the observations in bold indicate that the game was the second game for
the subjects. If we assume that experience reduces confusion and focus only on the pool of
experienced subjects, the experimental frequencies for 0 and 5 are then completely within
the theoretically predicted range.
Taking alternating equilibria into consideration also extends the range of predicted mean
expected payoﬀs. Table 2 in this paper shows that according to the symmetric equilibrium
employed by R-A the predicted mean payoﬀ is independent of the value of the prize. However,
in alternating equilibria, the mean payoﬀ is positively related to the value of the prize, which
is also consistent with the description of the experimental data provided by R-A (2000, pp.
495-496).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
These results appear to indicate that R-A’s failure to recognize the complete set of Nash
equilibria in their Investment game may have caused the authors to too readily reject Nash
equilibrium behavior as an explanation of behavior in the games they examine.
While this note addresses the results appearing in the two-player Investment game
analyzed in Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000) it also demonstrates that the uniqueness claim
in Proposition 1 of Rapoport and Amaldoss (2003) is false. R-A (2003) examines an n-
player all-pay auction of which the two-player Investment game in R-A (2000) is a special
case. Obviously, if uniqueness of equilibrium fails to hold for n =2the general statement of
uniqueness of equilibrium for arbitrary n also fails. While an analysis of the n-player case
is beyond the scope of the current manuscript,4 it is clear that arguments parallel to those
made in this paper concerning the experimental implications of a larger-than-recognized set
of Nash equilibria apply to the n- p l a y e rc a s ea sw e l l .
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P r o o fo fC l a i m1
We ﬁrst show the equivalence between R-A’s game and a similar game, but in which
ﬁr m sd on o tr e c e i v ea ne n d o w m e n t .F o rk ∈ {i,j},l e t :




r − ck if ck >c −k,
−ck if ck ≤ c−k. for k ∈ {i,j}.
By the Expected Utility Theorem, player k’s behavior is invariant to aﬃne transformations
of utility. Thus the game Γ0 with strategy spaces Ci, Cj such that Cj = Ci = C,a n dp a y o ﬀ
functions Vk(ck,c −k), k ∈ {i,j}, has exactly the same equilibria as the game Γ with strategy
spaces Ci, Cj such that Cj = Ci = C, and payoﬀ functions Uk(ck,c −k), k ∈ {i,j}.W i t ha
slight change in notation, the proof of Claim 1 for the game Γ0 can be found in Dechenaux,
Kovenock and Lugovskyy (2003), but we provide it here as well for completeness. Note that
by (5), the equilibrium expected payoﬀ in game Γ is equal to U∗
k = V ∗
k + e where V ∗
k is ﬁrm
k’s expected payoﬀ in game Γ0, k ∈ {i,j}.
We prove Claim 1 through a series of Lemmata. It follows from Nash (1950) that an
equilibrium exists. Throughout the proof, let (p∗
i,p ∗
j) be an equilibrium of the game. For
a given equilibrium (p∗
i,p ∗
j), let p∗
k(c) be the associated probability that ﬁrm k plays c, Sk
the associated support of ﬁrm k’s distribution, and V ∗
k ﬁrm k’s expected proﬁti nt h a t
equilibrium, k ∈ {i,j}.






, Si ∪ Sj = C. Consequently, V ∗
k =0for at least one
k, k ∈ {i,j}.
Proof. First, we show that (i) if a point v ∈ C, v>0,i si nt h es u p p o r to fa tl e a s to n eﬁrm,
then all points n ∈ C where 0 ≤ n<vmust be in the support of at least one ﬁrm. This
implies that (ii) 0 is in the support of at least one ﬁrm. Then, we use (ii) to show that (iii),
e is in the support of at least one ﬁrm. Combining (i) and (iii) completes the proof of the
lemma.
We ﬁrst show (i). Let v be a strictly positive integer with v ∈ Sk for some k ∈ {i,j}.
Suppose contrary to our claim that there exists an n<vsuch that n/ ∈ Si∪Sj. This implies
that there exists some u ≤ v such that u ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {i,j} and (u − 1) / ∈ Si ∪ Sj.







and ﬁrm l’s expected proﬁtf r o mp l a y i n g(u − 1) is given by:












−l(z),w eh a v eVl(u) <V l(u − 1).T h e r e f o r e ,u cannot be
in the support of ﬁrm l’s equilibrium distribution, a contradiction. Thus, we have established
(i).
W en o wt u r nt o( i i ) .F i r s tn o t et h a tﬁrm k’s expected proﬁtf r o mp l a y i n g0 is, regardless
o fi t so p p o n e n t ’ ss t r a t e g y :
Vk(0) = 0.
Suppose to the contrary that 0 / ∈ Sj ∪ Si.L e tn ≡ minn{n|n ∈ Si ∪ Sj}. Suppose without






−l0(z)r − n =0− n < 0,
since p∗
−l0(z)=0 , ∀z<n , a contradiction to the fact that n ∈ Sl0.T h u s0 ∈ Sj ∪ Si.
To complete the proof of the lemma, we show (iii). Suppose to the contrary that e/ ∈






−k(z)r − e = r − e>0, for k ∈ {i,j},
whereas its expected proﬁtf r o mp l a y i n g0 is:
Vk(0) = 0.
But, by (ii) above, 0 must be in the support of at least one ﬁrm k, a contradiction. Hence,
we have established (iii).
Combining (i) and (iii), we have shown that Si ∪Sj = C. Consequently, V ∗
k = Vk(0) = 0
for at least one k, which proves the lemma. Q.E.D.







i(c) > 0 and p∗
j(c) > 0,t h e np∗
i(n) > 0 and
p∗
j(n) > 0, for every n such that 0 ≤ n<c .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that there exists an investment v such that p∗
k(v) > 0,
k = i,j and n<vsuch that p∗
l(n)=0 , for some l ∈ {i,j}. This implies that there exists u,
u ≤ v such that u ∈ Si ∩ Sj a n ds u c ht h a t(u − 1) / ∈ Sl for some l ∈ {i,j}.F r o mL e m m a
1i tf o l l o w st h a ts i n c ep∗
l(u − 1) = 0,t h e np∗
−l(u − 1) > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,ﬁrm −l’s expected







while its expected proﬁta t(u − 1) is:





l(z)r − (u − 1).
Since p∗






l(z). It then follows that V−l(u − 1) >V −l(u),
contradicting u ∈ S−l. Q.E.D.






, if V ∗
l > 0 for some l ∈ {i,j},t h e n :
(i) Si ∩ Sj = ∅,
(ii) Firm l randomizes over all pure strategies c ∈ C for which c is odd and ﬁrm −l
randomizes over all pure strategies c ∈ C for which c is even,
(iii) V ∗
−l =0 .
Proof. First V ∗
l > 0 implies 0 / ∈ Sl.T h u s ,f r o mL e m m a1 ,0 ∈ S−l. It follows that 1 / ∈ S−l
since ﬁrm −l can increase its expected proﬁtb ym o v i n gm a s sf r o m1 to 0. Then, from
Lemma 1, 1 ∈ Sl. Suppose 2 ∈ Sl.T h e nw h e t h e r2 is in S−l or not, ﬁrm l can increase its
expected payoﬀ by moving all mass from 2 to 1.T h u s 2 / ∈ Sl, from which it follows that
2 ∈ S−l. Suppose now that 3 ∈ S−l. Then, whether 3 is in Sl or not, ﬁrm −l can increase its
expected payoﬀ by moving all mass from 3 to 2 (recall that ﬁrm l puts no mass at 2). Since
e is ﬁnite, it is straightforward to see that the same argument applies recursively to every
c ≤ e. That is, suppose c ∈ Sm and c/ ∈ S−m,t h e n(c +1 )/ ∈ Sm and (c +1 )∈ S−m, ∀c ∈ C
and m ∈ {i,j}.
(iii) follows immediately from the fact that 0 ∈ S−l. Q.E.D.






, if V ∗
i = V ∗
j =0 ,t h e nSi = Sj = C.
Proof. Let nj ≡ maxn{n|n ∈ Sj} and n ≡ max{ni,nj}. We claim that ni = nj = n = e.
Suppose nl > n−l.T h e n i t i s c l e a r t h a t Vl(nl) > 0, a contradiction to V ∗
l =0 .T h u s
ni = nj = n. Applying Lemma 1, n = e. The claim then follows from Lemma 2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5 There exists an equilibrium (p∗
i,p ∗
j) with payoﬀs V ∗
i = V ∗
j =0 .I nt h i se q u i l i b r i u m








r if c =0 ,1,...,e− 1,
1 − e
r if c = e.
Proof. If (p∗
i,p ∗
j) is an equilibrium with payoﬀs V ∗
i = V ∗
j =0 , then from Lemma 4, it follows
immediately that Sj = Si = C. We establish existence by construction. Since Sj = Si = C
and both ﬁr m so b t a i na ne x p e c t e dp r o ﬁto f0, if the following pair of matrix equations is
satisﬁed (with equality) for k ∈ {i,j}, we have constructed such an equilibrium.

       

111... ... 1
r 00... ... 0
rr00... 0
rrr0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... 0
rrr. . . r0

       





























       

(6)
11For a given k ∈ {i,j},( 6 )i sas y s t e mo fe +1equations and e +1unknowns. If the
leftmost matrix is non-singular, then (6) hasau n i q u es o l u t i o n . T he determinant of the
leftmost matrix is equal to (−1)
e+2 (r)
e 6=0 . Therefore (6) has a unique solution.








r > 0. The remaining probabilities can be solved by repeated
substitution of 1
r in place of p∗
−k(0) in (6), which yields p∗
−k(c)=1
r for c ∈ {0,1,...,e−1} and
p∗
−k(e)=1− e
r.S i n c er>eby assumption, the solutions to (6) are probabilities. Uniqueness
of an equilibrium satisfying the conditions in the lemma follows immediately from Lemma 4
and the fact that such an equilibrium must satisfy the system (6), for k ∈ {i,j}. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6 An equilibrium with V ∗
l > 0 for some l, l ∈ {i,j}, exists if and only if e is odd.
If e is odd, then there exist exactly two such equilibria (p∗
l,p ∗














if c = e















r if i =2 ,4,...,e− 1
0 if c =1 ,3,...,e
Proof. We prove existence by construction. Let l be the ﬁrm obtaining V ∗
l > 0 and let the
other ﬁrm be −l. From Lemma 3, the equilibrium must be of the alternating form, and ﬁrm
l must play pure strategies c ∈ C for which c is an odd number.
Suppose e is even. From Lemma 3, it follows that e is in S−l but not in Sl. Therefore
V ∗
−l = r − e>0.B u t t h i s a n d V ∗
l > 0 contradict Lemma 3. Therefore no equilibria with
V ∗
l > 0 exist when e is even, which proves the "only if" part of the statement.
Suppose e is odd. Then by Lemma 3, Sl = {1,3,...,e} and S−l = {0,2,...,(e − 1)}. It
follows that V ∗
l = r − e.F r o mL e m m a3 ,f o rﬁrm −l, the strictly positive p∗
−l(c)’s must be
the solution to the following system of e+1
2 equations:

   












−l(2) + ... + p∗
−l(e − 1)]r − e






... ... ... ... ...






























12Note that the number of equations coincides with the number of unknowns. The determinant
of the ﬁrst matrix equals (r)
(e+1)/2 > 0. T h i si ss u ﬃcient to prove uniqueness of the
solution. Moreover, in equilibrium V ∗
l = r−e = p∗
−l(0)r−1. Solving the system by repeated
substitution yields p∗





> 0 and p∗
−l(c)=2
r > 0 for c ∈ {2,...,(e − 1)}.W e


















so they are indeed probabilities.
We now turn to ﬁrm l’s strategy. Note that ﬁrm −l obtains an expected payoﬀ of 0 in
equilibrium, V ∗
−l =0 . From Lemma 3, the strictly positive p∗




   











l(1) + ... + p∗
l(e − 2)]r − (e − 1)






... ... ... ... ...



























Note that the number of equations coincides with the number of unknowns. The determinant
of the ﬁrst matrix equals (r)
(e−1)/2 > 0.T h i si ss u ﬃcient to prove uniqueness of the solution.
Solving the system by repeated substitution yields p∗
l(c)=2
r > 0,w h e r e2
r < 1, for all









Uniqueness of an equilibrium (p∗
k,p ∗
−k) satisfying V ∗
k > 0 and V ∗
−k =0follows from Lemma
3 and the fact that such an equilibrium must satisfy the systems (7) and (8), k ∈ {i,j}.
Thus using Lemma 3, if e is odd, there exists exactly one equilibrium in which V ∗
i > 0 and
exactly one equilibrium in which V ∗
j > 0. Q.E.D.
To complete the proof of the claim, it suﬃces to note that Lemma 1 implies that there
a r en oe q u i l i b r i ai nw h i c hb o t hﬁrms earn a strictly positive expected proﬁt. Therefore, all
equilibria of the game are characterized by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
13Game L Empirical distribution Equilibrium predictions
Investment Group 1 Group 2 Both Symmetric Alternating Range for both
groups equilibrium equilibria types of equilibria
c =0 0.116 0.222 0.169 0.125 0.250 [0.125, 0.250]
c =1 0.116 0.117 0.116 0.125 0.125 0.125
c =2 0.096 0.079 0.088 0.125 0.125 0.125
c =3 0.084 0.153 0.118 0.125 0.125 0.125
c =4 0.094 0.086 0.090 0.125 0.125 0.125
c =5 0.494 0.343 0.418 0.375 0.250 [0.250, 0.375]
Game H Empirical distribution Equilibrium predictions
Investment Group 1 Group 2 Both Symmetric Alternating Range for both
groups equilibrium equilibria types of equilibria
c =0 0.135 0.147 0.141 0.050 0.400 [0.050, 0.400]
c =1 0.065 0.044 0.055 0.050 0.050 0.050
c =2 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.050
c =3 0.040 0.066 0.053 0.050 0.050 0.050
c =4 0.044 0.094 0.069 0.050 0.050 0.050
c =5 0.662 0.594 0.628 0.750 0.400 [0.400, 0.750]
Table 1: Aggregate distribution of investment (observed and predicted for all types of
equilibria). Predicted frequencies of investment for alternating equilibria were computed
using fa in equation (4).
Game Observed Equilibrium prediction for expected payoﬀ
mean payoﬀ Symmetric Alternating Range for both
equilibrium equilibria types of equilibria
L( r =8 ) 5.536 5 6.5 [5, 6.5]
H( r =2 0 ) 6.845 5 12.5 [5, 12.5]
Table 2: Mean payoﬀs (observed and theoretically predicted for both types of equilibria).
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